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ABSTRACT: 
 
Transition from planned to a market economy is an evolutionary process.  Evolutions do 
not have finite beginning and ending points.  We may look to the beginning of transition in 1991 
when the Soviet Union broke up, or we may see it as beginning earlier, when the Soviet Union 
began to allow its firms to engage in private sales of output that exceeded state plans and to 
independently take part in international trade agreements.  At what point do we say that 
transition is complete?  Hence, it is quite difficult to say when any country begins and completes 
its transition. 
The United States and the European Union have categorized Kazakhstan differently with 
regard to its degree of transition.  The United States removed “non market economy” status from 
Kazakhstan, whereas the EU gave Kazakhstan an intermediate status. 
The first question that this work asks is how do these political bodies rank a country’s 
market orientation, and how did they arrive at different conclusions?   
These results are then compared to what transitional economists have to say on the 
evolution from a planned to a market economy.  The second question is, how do theoretical, 
academic economists differ in their analysis of the transition process?  By creating unique 
criteria sets from several papers, can one say that, according to any set, Kazakhstan is a market 
economy? 
We conclude that the reform process in Kazakhstan is still underway.  The government 
and the economy have experienced many radical reforms, but none completely satisfies the 
necessary conditions for being categorized as a market economy. 
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There are some transition economies which everyone agrees have enjoyed great success 
in reverting to a market economy, such as Slovenia. Other countries, such as Turkmenistan, 
everyone agrees is neither a market economy nor a democracy.  Other countries, such as 
Kazakhstan, are much more difficult to gauge.  This paper looks at the conclusions from the 
USA, the EU, and work by theoretical economists, to answer whether or not Kazakhstan has 
become a market economy, as the U.S. government has declared it has.  The conclusion is that it 
is “getting warmer,” but cannot be said to satisfy the criteria sets for a market economy. 
Kazakhstan began its gradual reform process in 1992.  In many areas, such as its pension 
reform, which created a pay-as-you-go system, or in the development of its banking sector, 
Kazakhstan appears to be a model transition economy.  Kazakhstan plans to privatize all land in 
2007.  However, an EU document states also that “structural and fiscal reform are still very much 
lagging behind, while corruption continues to be widespread.”
1 
There is a difference between the criteria sets and the conclusions by the United States 
and by the European Union on Kazakhstan’s market status.  To the EU, Kazakhstan improved 
from non-market economy to “special status” (still not a market economy) in 2000.  In 2002, 
Kazakhstan officially became a market economy to the American government. 
Oddly enough, it is not economists, but politicians who make a decision about which 
country “is” and which country “is not” a market economy.
2  The Department of Commerce in 
the United States labels economies as “market economy” or “not market economy.”  The 
European Union assigns to a country “market economy status” when it publishes lists of those 
countries accused of permitting dumping. 
In 2001, President Bush made the recommendation to Congress that Kazakhstan be taken 
of the Jackson Vanik List.  In March 2002, the U.S. Department of Commerce officially revoked 
Kazakhstan’s non-market economy status.  Its finding was that Kazakhstan had been effectively 
a market economy since October 2001.
3 
In its August 2002 report on Bilateral Trade Relations,
4 the EU still considered 
Kazakhstan to be a “non-market economy regime.” 
                                                 
1 European Union.  2001. The EU's relations with Kazakhstan. 
2 When the U.S. declared Russia to be a market economy, there was much speculation in the press that this result 
was politically-motivated. 
3 Department of Commerce (Office of Public Affairs). 2002. FACT SHEET, Market Economy Analysis of 
Kazakhstan. <http://www.ita.doc.gov> (22 February 2003) 
4 European Union. 2002. Bilateral Trade Relations, Kazakhstan, August.       4  
 
In 1998, Kazakhstan is grouped with non-market economy countries i n  a n  E U  
regulation.  Along with Kazakhstan were Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kyrghyzstan, Moldavia, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 
Within two years, this status changed. The EU has recognized that while Kazakhstan may 
not yet be a “market economy,” it has made significant progress: 
The process of reform in the Ukraine, Vietnam and Kazakhstan has fundamentally 
altered the economies of those countries and has led to the emergence of firms for 
which market-economy conditions prevail. These three countries have as a result 
moved away from the economic circumstances that inspired the use of the analogue-
country method.
5 
 
Kazakhstan was granted a "special market economy status" by the EU in 2000.
6 This is an 
intermediate category in between market economy and non-market economy status. Kyrghyzstan 
also has this special status. 
These events beg two questions: 
•  Firstly, How is it that the USA and the EU have not come to the same conclusion 
regarding Kazakhstan’s progress towards a market economy? 
•  Secondly, since it is political organizations, not economic ones, that assign “market 
economy” status, is Kazakhstan a market economy according to economists? 
Countries do not actually have to be market economies to be awarded this status.  What 
they must do is to demonstrate that significant progress has been made and that the country’s 
economy is following the path towards inevitably becoming a market economy. 
In 2001, the official Department of Commerce view was that Kazakhstan was becoming a 
market economy: 
Kazakhstan is continuing its transition to a market economy.  Key reforms 
underway include completing Kazakhstan’s privatization program, nurturing 
the nascent securities market, consolidating gains in pension reform and the 
banking sector, improving the investment climate and continuing to modify the 
                                                                                                                                                             
  European Union. 2000.  “Council Regulation (EC) No. 2238/2000 9 October 2000,” Official Journal of the 
European Communities. 11 October. L257: 2-3 
5 Vedrine,H., President of the EU Council. 2000. Council Regulation (EC) No 2238/2000 of 9 October 2000 
amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the 
European Community. 
6 Source is Tatiana Romon, of the European Union’s Delegation of the European Commission in Kazakhstan.     5  
 
trade regime as part of Kazakhstan’s efforts to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).
7 
 
That is not to say that the EU and the USA lack any set of criteria.  There are conditions 
that must be met before a country is called a market economy by either. 
  European Union Criteria  U.S. Department of 
Commerce Criteria 
Market-determined prices  State interference must be 
minor.   
Wage rates are established by 
the labor market. 
Control of resources  Disappearance of undue state 
control over resources and 
production decisions.  Law is 
transparent and non-discri-
minatory. 
State-ownership of resources is 
minimal. 
Accounting standards  International standards are 
followed. 
There are no holdovers from 
planned economy payment of 
debts, such as write-offs, barter, 
or payment through compen-
sation of debts. 
 
Property Rights  Law is transparent and effect-
tive. 
Insolvent firms are forced into 
bankruptcy. 
 
Exchange Rates  Exchange rates are not fixed. Currency  is  convertible. 
Foreign Investment    There is potential for foreign 
investment. 
 
 
Criteria set by the EU seem more restrictive than those of the USA.  The former 
emphasizes liberalization of all prices, not just wages.  Much is made of accounting standards, 
which do not appear to be emphasized by the USA.  The EU underscored property rights, 
whereas the USA put emphasis on opportunities for FDI.  Both sets place stress upon removing 
currency controls and both emphasize private use of resources.   
Many transition economies also wish to join the European Union.  For these countries, 
there are additional requirements.
8  Democratic institutions, including the rule of law, respect for 
human rights, and protection of minorities, must be supported.  The country must be willing to 
support the political, economic, and monetary aims of the union.  The economy should be able to 
cope with added competition pressures that EU membership will bring.  For those European 
                                                 
7 Unites States Trade Representative. 2001. Foreign Trade Barriers, Kazakhstan. 30 March. 
8 European Union. Enlargement.     6  
 
countries such as Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia, etc. that hope for full integration into 
Europe’s markets, political and economic requirements are stricter.   
While Kazakhstan closely follows its big brother of Russia, Russia has satisfied the EU 
criteria, while Kazakhstan has not.     
Economists have created conditions for accessing countries’ progress towards becoming 
a market economy and for comparing the progress of transition economies.  The well-known 
Hungarian, author of Hiways and Byways, Kornai (2000) is one.
9  Svejnar (2002) is another.
10  
Also considered are Melo et al (1996),
11  Lavigne (1999),
12 and Frydman & Rapaczynski 
(1994).
13 
Kornai’s conditions compare the differences between socialism and capitalism.  They 
include factors such as state control of property and resources, as did the American and European 
criteria sets.  However, Kornai also looks at political party attitudes and whether producers or 
consumers dominate the economic system.   
 
Table: Kornai’s Classification 
  SOCIALISM CAPITALISM 
1: Political Control  Central Party   Pro-private property party 
2:  Economic  Control  State dominates the econ-
omy. 
Private property interests 
dominate the economy. 
3: Economic Coordina- 
    tion 
Bureaucratic organization 
and coordination 
Allocation and production 
decisions are market-based.  
4: Resource Efficiencies  Soft budget constraints  Hard budget constraints 
5: Market Efficiencies  Sellers market; goods’ short-
ages; and labor short-age 
Buyers’ Market; no shortages, 
and unemployment 
 
Kornai emphasized points 1-3: private property is protected and dominates the economy 
and private parties control resources.   When this occurs, according to Kornai, the country is on 
the whole a market economy as transition is mostly complete.  
                                                 
9 Kornai, J. 2000a. What the Change of System from Socialism to Capitalism Does and Does Not Mean,” The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 14(I): 27-42. 
10 Svejnar, J. 2002. “Transition Economies: Perfection and Challenges,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(1) 
Winter: 3-28. 
11 De Melo, M.; Denizer, C.; & Gelb, A. 1996. From Plan to Market, Patterns of Transition. The World Bank Policy 
Research Department, Transition Economics Division. January. Working Paper No. 1564. 
12 Lavigne, M. 1999. The Economics of Transition From Socialist Economy to Market Economy. (London: 
Macmillan Press): 276. 
13 Frydman, R. & Rapaczynski, A. 1994. Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press)     7  
 
Neoclassical economists, who advised transition economy leaders in the early 1990’s, 
believed that market activity would spontaneously occur, once controls were lifted.  Kornai also 
felt that by removing state controls, the barriers to capitalism were removed.  So removal of 
politically created, economic barriers is a major component of transition. 
Kornai does not argue that democracy is a necessary condition for capitalism, but that   
capitalism is a necessary condition for democracy. 
Using Kornai’s classification for what makes a “capitalist” economy, we see that 
efficiency is not a necessary condition.  On the other hand, private property rights and price-
coordination are. This is an institutionalist approach.  In another piece by Kornai, he writes that, 
“the transition from socialism to capitalism has to be an organic development.  It cannot be done 
otherwise.  It is a curious amalgam of revolution and evolution.”
14  The revolution began in 1991 
when the Soviet Union dissolved.  The evolution has been occurring since then. 
Let us examine how well Kazakhstan has satisfied Kornai’s criteria. 
•  Does the dominant political party protect property rights?  Kazakhstan has privatized all 
property except for land.  There is currently a problematic land reform plan that is scheduled 
to begin in 2007.  There are bankruptcy and property laws.  However, problems in clarifying 
the legal code and high corruption cannot ensure the sanctity of property rights.  Kazakhstan 
has mostly, but not fully satisfied Kornai’s first criterion. 
•  Is the state’s role in resource management and production decisions minimal?  The largest 
sector in the Kazakhstani economy is oil and gas.  The government controls oil and gas 
resources, and investment in this sector has led to the development of new large state-
enterprises. 
The share of state-owned industrial production as a percentage of the total fell from 
74.6 to 2.5 percent
15 between 1992 and 2000.  However, 33.5 percent of farms were private, 
and 18.9 percent of rural land was privately owned in 2000.
16 (This is soon to be changed in 
2007.)  
Kazakhstan plans to liberalize control of land resources, but there are no plans for 
liberalizing oil and gas resources. 
                                                 
14 Kornai, J. 2000b. “Ten Years After the Road to a Free Economy: The Author’s Self Evaluation,” World Bank 
Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics. April 18-20 2000. 
15Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 2001. Statisticheski Yezhagodnik Kazakhstan.  (Almaty: 
Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan): 248. 
16 Ibid: 255.     8  
 
•  Who, or what, coordinates economic decisions?  Decisions on what to produce and how to 
produce are mostly independent of government control.  One key exception is restrictive 
labor laws (and no WTO “national treatment”), making it difficult to import specialized 
workers.  Another is the control of oil and gas resources. 
•  Hard budget constraints appear to have replaced soft, thus satisfying the third criterion. 
•  The fourth issue is are resources allocated efficiently?  Labor and capital markets are 
independent of government intervention.. There appears to be little state-directed investment, 
and the minimum wage is so low as to appear non-binding upon private employers.
17  Land 
allocation will be changing in 2007.  
•  Is the economy efficient? Efficiency is usually indicated by normalization of prices.  This is 
not the case in Kazakhstan, even within the same area.  Inadequate infrastructure, especially 
in the rural sector, creates problems for rural producers. 
There is low official unemployment (10-11 percent), but high underemployment.   
Government salaries and pensions are very low.  The former results in talented people 
leaving the public sector and encourages state capture. 
A strong indicator of economic efficiency, when governance issues are factored in, is the 
Index of Economic Freedom, which ranks countries from 1 (best) to 5 (worst).  Kazakhstan 
began in 1998 with a rating of 4.28.
18  It has improved its ranking to 3.70 in 2002 and 2004 
(economic freedom worsened in 2003).  Kazakhstan was downgraded for its barriers to 
capital flows.  The fiscal burden of the government, price and wage liberalization, and low 
government intervention were the country’s best attributes. 
Kornai’s criteria require that a country has moved from the planned system to the market 
system, minimally with respect to points 1 to 3 in the table above.  Point 3 is satisfied, but 
Kazakhstan has not yet moved from the planned to the market system in points 1 and 2.   
Kazakhstan is not yet a market economy. 
                                                 
17 Minimum wager-earners are usually civil servants.  For example, $50 is about the lowest wage for an unskilled 
worker who is privately hired.  Public employees are often paid the legal minimum wage, which is less 
($36 in March 2004). 
18 Miles, M., Feulner, Jr., E. & O’Grady, M. 2004. Index of Economic Freedom. (Washington D.C.: Heritage 
Foundation): 247.  For comparison, this is the same rating that Bangladesh and Yemen received.     9  
 
Svejnar looks at three classes of variables in comparing the success of transition 
economies:  macroeconomic stabilization; microeconomic restructuring; and social indicators.
19 
Judging success requires a somewhat deeper mode of analysis than deciding if an economy is or 
is not a market one.  The analysis has changed from a bimodal one to a qualitative one.  
The argument is that market economies are Pareto superior to planned economies, 
because they can improve quality of life the most.  Since all transition economies are evolving 
towards, or have already become, market systems, those that are more successful should be more 
market-oriented.  Anecdotal evidence supports this.  Life in reformed Poland and Slovenia is 
significantly better than life in Russia which is less market oriented than they, which is still 
better than life in reform-resistant countries like Turkmenistan.    
Svejnar judges that transition is complete when government monopoly ceases and 
economic growth is evident.  “I would define the end of transition as a state when these 
economies replace central planning by a functioning market system and when they generate 
rapid and sustained rates of economic growth that enable them to interact with the more 
advanced market economies without major forms of protection.”
20  In this 2002 work, Svejnar 
did not categorize FSU countries as nearly market economies, but did comment favorably upon 
Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic. 
Can Kazakhstan satisfy Svejnar’s standards?   
•  Has the macroeconomy stabilized?  Kazakhstan currently has high growth in GDP, which is 
currently about 10 percent per annum.  Growth rates increased between 1998 and 2000, from 
5.1 to 14.9 to 18.8 percent.
 21   However, growth in the Kazakhstani economy is more of a 
function of oil and gas prices, than it is of increased output.  Inflation in the 2000’s is in the 
teens.  The government has done much, spending and investing little and saving much, to pay 
debts and maintain fiscal surpluses.  The economy in 2004 appears to be continuing its trend 
of healthy growth. 
                                                 
19  Svejnar’s criteria are almost exactly those suggested by the IMF (2000).  The IMF’s criteria include (i) 
liberalization; (ii) stabilization; (iii) restructuring of firms; and (iv) legal and institutional reform. 
 
20 Svejnar, J. 2002. “Transition Economies: Perfection and Challenges,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(1) 
Winter: 26. 
21 Ibid: 10.     10  
 
•  Have firms been restructured?  Firms are mostly privately owned and are undergoing 
restructuring.  Officially published statistics state that in 2001, 16.1 percent of all firms were 
state-owned.
22  Privatization statistics are presented in Table 4. 
State-owned firms are still most common for large-size firms (59%).  Eighty-one percent 
of small-size firms are privately owned.
23 
Foreign investment is allowed.  Foreigners must control less than 50 percent of a firm, or 
a resident may create a local, Kazakhstani corporation.  FDI in Kazakhstan is primarily in the 
oil and gas sector.  From 1993 to 1999 Kazakhstan received almost 10 billion USD in direct 
investment from foreign investors.  Total FDI per capita for 2000 was 2.75 billion USD of 
which 71 percent was in the “Mining Sector” (oil and gas).
24   
Rural privatization through the Land Code was proposed in 2002, and approved by 
the Parliament in March 2003.  This plan called for the privatization of 90 million hectares of 
land and for sales to be limited to citizens of Kazakhstan.
25  The program begins in 2007, 
when hectares of land will be sold at fixed prices:  $100 to $400 per hectare of arable land 
and $400 to $1,600 per hectare of the best arable land. 
How are social indicators in Kazakhstan?  Below are statistics from 1995 and 2001.  
Deaths are down moderately.  Infant mortality and homicide statistics have been greatly 
improved.  Both marriage and divorce rates are creased.  The birth rate is down substantially.  
The third Svejnar criterion is the existence of favorable social indicators, as indicators of 
institutional development.  From these indicators, there is room for progress, but life appears 
to be improving. 
                                                 
22 Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2002) 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Konstantinov, A. 2003. “Parliament pushing for private ownership of Kazakh agricultural land,”  The Kazakhstan 
Monitor 10(27), 14 March: 2.     11  
 
Table: Social Indicators 
Year Births  Deaths  Infant  Homicide  Suicide  Marriage  Divorce 
  /1000 /1000 Mortality  /100000  /100000  /1000 /1000 
   /1000 
Births 
    
1995  17,5 10,2 25,4 20,3 29,9 7,3  2,4 
2001  14,6 10,0 19,6 15,6 29,7 6,3  2,0 
95-01 
Change 
↓16,6%  ↓2,3%  ↓22,8%  ↓23,2%  ↓0,7%  ↓13,7%  ↓16,7% 
Source: Statistical Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1999, 2002) 
The World Bank reported that longevity in Kazakhstan was the lowest among all 
transition countries.
26  The statistics from the Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan generally point 
in the direction of improved living standards, yet longevity remains low.  The most recent 
statistic was 71.1 years for women and 60.2 years (less than the age of retirement) for men.
27  It 
is not known how much economic conditions (and the stress of change, unemployment, and 
poverty) and how much Kazakhstan’s environmental problems
28 are at fault.  Otherwise, the only 
negative indicators were a rural fertility rate, that fell substantially, and a slightly lower number 
of per capita marriages. 
Using Svejnar’s criteria, of macroeconomic stabilization, microeconomic restructuring, 
and social, health indicators, would suggest that Kazakhstan is, or is nearly, a market economy.  
The economy is growing and macroeconomic variables are about where expected.  Inflation rates 
are high, but not excessively.  Microeconomic restructuring results are mixed.  Privatization has 
been limited thus far.  There is a large discrepancy in incomes following independence. 
Unemployment and underemployment remain high.  Kazakhstani firms in general are not 
attracting much foreign investment; FDI is concentrated in the oil and gas sector.  Indicators of 
health have nearly all improved in recent years.  Longevity statistics still hold Kazakhstan down   
Kazakhstan does not satisfy Svejnar’s criteria perfectly, but it seems on the threshold of doing 
so. 
                                                 
26 World Bank. 2003. Europe and Central Asia: Regional data from the WDI database. 
27 Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan. 2001. Statisticheskii Yezhegodnik. (Almaty: Statistical Agency of the RK). 
28 Kazakhstan has non-economic conditions that will decrease lifespan:  urban pollution, Aral Sea environmental 
degradation, and radiation from former Soviet nuclear testing.     12  
 
Another well-known paper on the process of reform in transition countries is de Melo et 
al (1996).
29  This paper contrasts the economic differences between the planned, Soviet system 
and the transition stage.  This is followed by the author’s expected results after the transitional 
period has been completed and a nascent market economy is firmly in place. 
 
Table:  de Melo et al’s Changes from Planned to Transitional Economies 
  Planned System  Transitional Period 
Macroeconomic balances  Balances are achieved 
through direct government 
supervision. 
Destabilized. 
Economic, political, and 
social decision-making 
These are coordinated 
through the Party. 
Coordinating mechanisms are 
disrupted. 
Private ownership  Minimal.  Growth of private sector. 
Relative prices  Distorted.  Structural reallocation of 
resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 De Melo, M.; Denizer, C.; & Gelb, A. 1996. From Plan to Market, Patterns of Transition. The World Bank Policy 
Research Department, Transition Economics Division. January. Working Paper No. 1564.     13  
 
Let us pursue this evolution, to results that are expected when transition is completed, or mostly 
completed. 
Table:  Results of Changes when Transition is Complete 
  Transition is complete. 
Macroeconomic  balances  Changes in GDP are not 
erratic; inflation and 
unemployment are within the 
bounds of a similar, non-
transition economy.  
Economic, political, and 
social decision-making 
Private interests, rather than 
politicians, direct changes in 
the society. 
Citizens have an under-
standing of how markets 
work, so that rational deci-
sions can be made. 
Private  ownership  Registration of property is 
clear and rights are 
effectively, not nominally, 
protected by a court of law. 
Relative prices  Market  mechanisms  are 
mostly able to prevent 
shortages and surpluses and 
information is available, so 
that relative prices are 
correct. 
 
We use de Melo et al’s conditions during reform to predict expected results when a country has 
evolved from a non-market to a market economy.  Instabilities are replaced by the relative 
stability of a market economy.  Ignorance of market operations is replaced with sufficient 
understanding to make seemingly rational decisions.  Not only does private property exist, but 
also these rights are protected by a court and registration system that is efficient and fair. 
Whether an economy is, or is not, a market economy does not depend on proclamations 
that private enterprise will happen or by privatization or by regaining lost output.  Institutional 
development is necessary or a country will remain a transition economy and never fully mature.  
Changes in macroeconomic indicators will be erratic; decision making is impaired; property 
rights are not truly secure; and prices remain distorted.  It is evident in Kazakhstan today that 
although it may be a “market economy” according to the USA, that it has not completed its 
transition, if one follows these criteria.  Something more is needed than simply stabilization,     14  
 
privatization and the recovery of growth rates.  It requires  basic economic literacy and savvy 
and decision making that is nearly free of political considerations.   
Lavigne (1999) goes farther by writing that a when we are no longer constantly reminded 
that an economy was once a planned economy, then transition is complete.  Using these criteria, 
few FSU countries would pass this test and countries such as Slovenia would easily pass them.  
Lavigne also uses EU accession eligibility for European transition economies as a robust test for 
completion of a country’s transition. 
Frydman & Rapaczynski (1994)
30 described “transition” as a period of state withdrawal 
from its central position.  Following this line of thought, we can conclude that transition is 
complete when the government no longer can sets prices and controls resources.   
In Kazakhstan, government mostly does not set prices, although its national wealth of oil 
and gas reserves are controlled by the government.  This, however, is not dissimilar to many 
socialist, developed countries.  Investment in oil and gas has even encouraged many large, new 
state enterprises to be created.  It is not clear, if the government,
31 which is largely controlled by 
a strong president, has withdrawn from economic decision making. 
However, Frydman & Rapaczynski also point out that market decisions are frequently 
made through institutions, such as corporations, rather than individuals making independent 
decisions.  The processes of obtaining information, dissemination, analysis, and decision making 
are created by cooperating individuals.  Managers control the flow of information while 
government regulators maintain the interests of the general society.  Managers must understand 
market signals, know where to find information, and how to respond to it.  If this is absent, then 
command-and-control management could be more efficient than private management.  In the 
early 1990s, the belief was that decentralization would release productive energies. This is not 
evident in all transition economies.  One explanation for this is the institutional type explanation, 
such as Frydman & Rapaczynski’s. 
It is clear in Kazakhstan that dissemination of information is a mess.  This is particularly 
the case when it comes to governance issues.  The rules are quite strict, but ways to adhere to the 
rules are not commonly known, which creates opportunities for corruption.  Laws are not well 
                                                 
30 Frydman, R. & Rapaczynski, A. 1994. Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away?   Central 
European University Privatization Project 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
31 The government consists of a strong president who dominates the courts and Parliament.  Government is still 
centralized with local government leaders answering to those in the capital of Astana.     15  
 
understood and courts implement them in a free manner.  Statistical data for the republic is quite 
good.  Little is known about consumers. 
As has been suggested here, institutions are needed to support a fair and efficient 
economic system.  These institutions are partly cultural.  Fair market practices may be 
understood, but completely ignored, because the culture does not yet support them. In other 
cases, market economic behavior is learned, and people are learning this more slowly than 
economists imagined. 
Linz (2000) asked, “are Russians really ready for capitalism?”  She found deviations in 
Russian students’ attitudes from American ones, that she felt would undermine market 
development.  So long as beliefs needed for market institutions are weak, the institutions cannot 
exist.  So long as necessary economic institutions are absent, transition cannot be complete.   
Without survey data, it is difficult to answer if Kazakhstanis are ready for capitalism.  It 
seems that they are certainly ready for the wealth that foreign investment and exploitation of 
natural resources have delivered, not to mention rent-seeking activities in the early years of 
independence.  However, many people look fondly upon the days of Soviet order and 
egalitarianism.  What is also evident is that Kazakhstanis are not ready in the sense that basic 
understanding of such issues as supply-and-demand, service-mentality, and the sanctity of 
contracts are lacking. 
 
Conclusion 
The initial questions were: how did the USA and the EU arrive at different decisions 
concerning Kazakhstan’s market status and do analyses by economists differ from the findings of 
the EU and USA? 
The answers to these questions lie partly in the nature of the criteria set and partly in the 
fact that political agencies, as opposed to academic economists, are making these decisions.  
Independent, academic economists are less likely to be swayed by political considerations, such 
as a gratitude for Kazakhstan’s giving up nuclear weapons or the desire for Kazakhstan’s oil and 
gas reserves, or for its pro-western stance in international politics.  Secondly, we see that both 
criteria sets are limited, the USA’s more so than the EU’s.  Their criteria are binomial: yes or no.  
Those of economists are more qualitative.  Svejnar includes welfare factors; Lavigne includes     16  
 
perceptions.  Here we also emphasize knowledge of basic business and economics by the 
citizenry, the rapid evolution of which was taken for granted in the early 1990’s. 
Having discussed several academic works on the subject, we see that Kazakhstan is not 
yet a market economy.  This conclusion is based upon the fact that it does not fully satisfy any of 
the criteria sets that can be created from the work of theoretical economists.  Kazakhstan does, 
however, satisfy many of these criteria.  Hence, it is more likely that academic economists would 
be more in agreement with the conclusions of the EU than with the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. 
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